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Domestic and export demand for distillers’ dried grains (DDG) has increased since 
the early 2000s. DDG have become an important component of livestock feed given 
its nutritional value and competitive price. Over the last decade, China has become 
one of the major export destinations for U.S. DDG. However, there have been recent 
changes in trade policies in China. In this thesis, we develop an inverse demand 
equation to analyze the impact of China’s policies on U.S. DDG prices. The model 
contributes to the literature by incorporating domestic and international demand 
through which exogenous shocks, such as China’s trade barriers, may affect U.S. 
DDG prices. Our results provide evidence that U.S. DDG prices are significantly 
lower during the time that anti-dumping and countervailing duties are in place.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Distillers’ dried grains (DDG) is a coproduct produced by dry-mill ethanol plants 
(Hoffman and Baker 2011). Initially, DDG was considered a waste product (Stewart 
et al. 2017). However, DDG is now recognized as a rich source of energy and protein 
making it a good substitute for corn and soybean meal in livestock and poultry diets. 
Adding DDG into these diets may present nutritional and/or price constraints. The 
volume of DDG to be incorporated in the animal feed depends on the nutrient 
requirements of the livestock/poultry species and the cost of alternative diet 
ingredients (Hoffman and Baker 2011). The animal nutrition industry has developed a 
strong demand for U.S. DDG as production of DDG has expanded (Stewart et al. 
2017). 
Ethanol production, and consequently, DDG production has been increasing in 
the United States over the last decade. Ethanol production increased by 13.79 billion 
gallons between 2000 and 2016, with most of this increase after 2006 (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration 2018). The sharp increase in ethanol supply was mainly 
driven by high crude oil prices, large tax credits for ethanol blenders, vast net exports 
in 2010 and 2011 and the Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) mandates (Irwin and 
Good 2012). This increase in ethanol production contributed to an increase of over 
43.71 million tons of DDG production between 2000 and 2016 (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration 2018). In 2016, the United States produced approximately 
44.31 million tons of DDG.1 Of this total, 70% of DDG were consumed domestically 
while the remaining 30% was exported.2  Exports of U.S. DDG have also been 
                                                 
1 Data calculated from ethanol production based on USDA calculation (1 bu of corn yields 2.8 gal 
ethanol generating 17.75 lbs DDG per bushel of corn) (USDA AMS 2018).  
2 Percentages calculated from comparison between total exports (Source: USDA ERS 2018) and 
consumption (calculated from total production minus total exports). 
2 
 
increasing during this time period by 11.76 million tons (USDA ERS 2018). In 2016, 
the United States delivered DDG to 50 countries around the world compared to only 
22 countries in 2000 (U.N. Comtrade 2018).  
China has emerged as an important import market of U.S. DDG. Prior to 2008, 
China sporadically imported small amounts of DDG. It was not until 2009 when the 
amount of DDG shipped to China became prominent. In 2008, China imported 9.37 
thousand tons of DDG, and by 2010 they were the number one importer of U.S. DDG, 
importing approximately 2.79 million tons from the United States. However, exports 
of U.S. DDG to China have fluctuated due to market instability (USDA ERS 2018). 
China’s potential imports of U.S. DDG depend on the price of corn, Chinese policies, 
and the availability and prices of other substitute feed ingredients (Jewison and Gale 
2012). There have been several policies implemented by the Chinese government that 
have affected the trade of DDG over the last several years. The objective of this thesis 
is to analyze the impact of domestic and export demand on DDG prices in the United 
States. In particular, the impact of China’s government investigations and policies on 
U.S. DDG prices. 
Previous literature has focused on the interrelations between corn, soybean 
meal and DDG prices (Anderson, Anderson and Sawyer 2008; Tejeda 2012; Irwin 
and Good 2013; Johnson et al. 2015; Etienne, Trujillo-Barrera and Hoffman 2017). 
These studies found correlation among the prices over varying time periods. Our 
study contributes to the literature by incorporating domestic and international demand 
through which exogenous shocks, such as China’s trade barriers, may affect U.S. 
DDG prices. With an increasing importance of the U.S. DDG export markets, this 
exposure may allow for further fluctuations of U.S. DDG prices. Identifying factors 
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that contribute to the fluctuations in prices is relevant to understanding the future of 
the DDG market.  
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 contains background information 
on the DDG market and on China’s policies that are related to DDG. Section 3 
provides an overview of previous literature on the analysis of U.S. DDG prices and 
inverse demand models. Section 4 presents the modeling procedure used to derive an 
inverse demand equation of U.S. DDG prices. Section 5 presents data description and 
data manipulation. Sections 6 and 7 discuss the empirical specification and results, 
respectively, related to the U.S. DDG prices inverse demand equation. Section 8 
provides a discussion on what to expect for the future of the U.S. DDG export market 
to China and concluding remarks. References are in section 9. Figures and tables are 
presented in section 10. Finally, section 11 is the appendix, containing the R code 
used to run our models. 
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Chapter 2: Background  
This section is divided into two parts. First, we present data to characterize the DDG 
domestic and international market. Second, we chronologically describe the DDG 
trade pattern between the United States and China, identifying factors that may be 
correlated with the apparent fluctuations in U.S. DDG prices.  
2.1 DDG Market 
Production of DDG in the United States has continued to rise over the last several 
years due to increases in ethanol production (figure 1). While exports of DDG have 
increased overtime, the percent of total U.S. DDG production that is exported has 
decreased from around 30% in 2015 to nearly 24% in 2017 (USDA ERS 2018). Thus, 
the domestic market has been consuming more DDG over time. In 2015, U.S. DDG 
exports reached 14 million tons, the highest amount of DDG the United States has 
ever exported. While the United States was still the largest exporter of DDG in the 
world in 2016, exports declined to 12.65 million tons (figure 2) (U.N. Comtrade 
2018).3 Over the last several years, China and Mexico have been the top export 
markets for U.S. DDG. 
In 2015, China imported a record annual amount of 7.12 million tons of DDG 
from the United States (figure 3) (USDA ERS 2018). However, from 2015 to 2016, 
the amount of U.S. DDG exports to China declined. China remained as the largest 
market for U.S. DDG exports in 2016, importing 2.58 million tons, but only 
representing 20.7% of the total U.S. DDG exports compared to 51% of the exports in 
2015. Mexico was the second largest importer in 2016, importing 2.10 million tons 
representing 16.6% of total U.S. exports. Mexico has imported DDG from the United 
States since 1989, but the rate of Mexican imports has not followed the Chinese boom 
                                                 
3 At the time of writing this paper, The U.N. Comtrade was not updated with the 2017 data. 
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in DDG imports (USDA ERS 2018). In 2017, China disappeared from the top U.S. 
DDG importers list, importing only 415.96 thousand tons (USDA ERS 2018). 
Mexico, Turkey and South Korea became the United States most important trade 
partners of DDG purchasing 2.30 million tons, 1.62 million tons and 1.04 million 
tons, respectively (USDA ERS 2018).  
While China was not a major player in the DDG market prior to 2009, they 
have become an important export market for the U.S. DDG. China’s rising 
agricultural imports reflect its growing demand for animal feed and the relative 
scarcity of its land resources (Gale, Hansen and Jewison 2015). As China’s demand 
for animal proteins has increased, demand for livestock feed products has increased 
causing China to become a net importer of livestock feed products, including DDG 
(Fabiosa et al. 2009). Figure 4 depicts important aspects of the DDG trade between 
the United States and China.4 The proximity between the curves of China’s total 
imports of DDG and U.S. exports to China indicates that the United States is China’s 
most important trade partner in the DDG market. From 2009 to 2017, the percentage 
of DDG exported from the United States to China ranged from a minimum of 11.6% 
to a maximum of 53.7%. There is evidence that the sudden drop in China’s U.S. DDG 
imports over the last years is related to the Chinese government interventions in the 
DDG market.   
2.2 China’s Policies Related to DDG 
China’s domestic policies appear to have a large impact on U.S. DDG imports. Bans 
on shipments, anti-dumping and countervailing investigations and duties, quality 
requirements, and uneven regulations for inspection and quarantine are only some of 
                                                 
4 China’s total imports of “brewing or distilling dregs and waste” data for 2017 was not updated on U.N. 
Comtrade Database at the time this figure was made. 
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the factors that illustrate the uncertainty surrounding trade with China. However, 
China’s policies have been more economically open to trade during some periods. For 
example, in the mid-1990s, China cut tariffs and eliminated the value-added tax on 
imports of soybean meal, DDG and other grain-milling by-products to address the 
deficit in raw feed materials. In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), and the country agreed to eliminate export subsidies, even though the 
Chinese government still applied tariff rate quotas (TRQ) on corn imports and other 
products (Rumbaugh and Blancher 2004). Because of this economic flexibility, the 
total commodity exports from the United States to China began to sharply increase 
(Hansen et al. 2017). China’s large increase in the demand for meat caused expansion 
of livestock production which ultimately drove an increased demand for feedstuffs 
including DDG (Hansen et al. 2017). Based on data from the USDA ERS (2018), 
China’s frequency and total quantity of DDG imports from the United States 
increased after 2009 (figure 5).  
While trade between China and other countries was intensifying, new policies 
to promote food security and price stability, and to increase farmers’ income were 
taking place. These policies have been causing distortions in the international market 
(Hansen et al. 2017). China was a net exporter of grains until the minimal price 
support policy was established in 2008 despite low international corn prices (Gale, 
Hansen and Jewison 2015). This environment was favorable for continued expansion 
of U.S. DDG exports to China. From 2008 to 2015, there was a reduction on the 
demand for foreign and domestic corn in China. The combination of the minimal 
price policy and TRQ on corn imports contributed to increase imports of alternatives 
to corn such as DDG, barley and sorghum and consequently, corn stocks from 
domestic production increased (Gale, Hansen and Jewison 2015). The government 
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steadily increased the minimal price required to receive support for major grain crops, 
creating a gap between the national prices in China and international prices (Hejazi 
and Marchant 2017). Hence, the demand for international agricultural commodities 
increased and a large stockpile of agricultural commodities was accumulated, leading 
to the decision to end the minimal price support for corn in 2015 (Hejazi and 
Marchant 2017). Since 2015, China has been cutting down supports for national 
products, especially for cotton, soybean and corn (Zhong and Zhu 2017). Among the 
possible reasons for this decision, the Chinese government claims that many 
producers became dependent on high support prices to stay profitable (Hejazi and 
Marchant 2017). Consequently, corn prices in China are falling, and a portion of the 
stocks have lost their value as they have become too deteriorated to sell. These 
cheaper Chinese corn prices caused a reduction in the imports of corn and its 
substitutes, including DDG (Hejazi and Marchant 2017).  
In December 2016, China’s administration of TRQs for rice, wheat and corn 
was questioned given issues related to application criteria, TRQ allocations and its 
announcements. Quota allocations are set upon private sector necessity and 
government interests (Michael, Anderson-Sprecher and Jiang 2014). Trade import 
opportunities were not clear, which reduced the market Accessed opportunities for 
worldwide producers (U.S. Trade Representative 2018). In 2017, TRQs were at 7.2 
million tons of grains, unchanged from 2016 with non-state trade importers 
accounting for 40% of total quota allocations (Kim 2017). The TRQ rate has 
fluctuated significantly, however it usually has not exceeded a 50% rate (Anderson-
Sprecher, Wei and Liwen 2015).  
While minimal price supports and TRQ's were in place, several other Chinese 
policies impacted the monthly volatility of U.S. DDG exports to China, as shown in 
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figure 5. China became the top importer of U.S. DDG in 2010 (USDA ERS 2018). In 
late 2010, China began an anti-dumping investigation into U.S. DDG imports with the 
investigation continuing until mid-2012, see figure 5 (MOCPRC 2012). The 
objectives of the investigation were, first, to analyze whether the U.S. DDG imported 
to China was dumped and the margin of dumping, and second, to evaluate the 
existence and intensity of damages the U.S. DDG imports could be causing the 
Chinese DDG industry (MOCPRC 2012). During this investigation, China’s imports 
slowed down, especially in the first half of the period. In 2011, Mexico overtook 
China as the top U.S. DDG importer. However, in 2012 China regained the lead and 
continued as the top importer until 2016, when the sudden drop in Chinese imports 
led Mexico to the first position again in 2017 (USDA ERS 2018). This recent 
contraction of the Chinese DDG imports was primarily driven by Chinese government 
policies.  
Chinese officials’ concern over genetically modified (GM) traits in imported 
products have contributed to the adoption of import restraints over time that 
consequently affect the U.S. DDG market (U.S. Trade Representative 2018; Gale, 
Hansen and Jewison 2015), see figure 5. In July 2013, China started requiring a 
“GMO test report” for U.S. DDG plus an official U.S. government stamp to certify 
that DDG shipments did not contain GM material (U.S. Trade Representative 2018; 
Gale, Hansen and Jewison 2015). In November 2013, China imposed a zero-tolerance 
policy for unapproved GMOs after testing and detecting MIR 162 (an unapproved 
GM trait) in U.S. corn causing the rejection of U.S. corn shipments (Roberts and 
Bukovac 2015). Consequently, in December of 2013, China also began testing DDG 
and shipments were rejected when the GM trait was detected (MOCPRC 2013). 
Throughout 2014, there was large volatility in the trade of DDG between the two 
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countries and between October and November 2014 the U.S. DDG exports to China 
dropped significantly (USDA ERS 2018). In December of 2014, China approved the 
MIR 162 trait and shipments of DDG products from the United States began again in 
2015 (Roberts and Bukovac 2015), see figure 5. By May 2015, the monthly U.S. 
DDG exports to China reached the highest level of 1.06 million tons, an accumulation 
of 7.12 million tons for the year (USDA ERS 2018). Following the record high 
monthly exports in May, June and July of 2015, U.S. DDG exports to China began to 
fall. Between July 2015 and March 2016 monthly DDG exports fell 87% (USDA ERS 
2018), see figure 5.  
In January 2016, the Commerce Ministry of China started another anti-
dumping and countervailing investigation on imports of DDG (MOFCOM 2016), see 
figure 5. Later in September 2016, the investigation supported China’s decision to 
impose anti-dumping duties of 33.8% on U.S. DDG and countervailing duties ranging 
from 10% to 10.7% (MOCPRC 2017).5 In January 2017, China announced that new 
anti-dumping duties would increase ranging from 42.2% to 53.7% while the 
countervailing duties were raised to a range of 11.2% to 12% (MOCPRC 2017). The 
duties negatively affected U.S. DDG producers by reducing the exports to China, 
leading the United States to follow new strategies of diversification to other markets 
(IFBF Research and Commodity Services 2016) such as Vietnam and South Korea 
(USDA ERS 2018). In 2017, the DDG exports to China sharply dropped as Chinese 
buyers switched to alternatives (e.g. soybean) as a strategy to avoid the exorbitant 
import costs. In 2018, exports to China have been shrinking even more. Additionally, 
the Chinese government has provided incentives to domestic ethanol production, 
                                                 
5 Anti-dumping duties vary for different U.S. companies. They are set according to a criterion established 
by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China. 
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which may increase the domestic DDG production in the country (Clever 2018). So 
far, the Chinese DDG production remains limited and quality of the corn stored may 
be of concern (Clever 2018).  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
Previous research analyzing DDG prices has primarily focused on the relation 
between DDG prices and corn and soybean meal prices. Anderson et al. (2008), 
Tejeda (2012), Irwin and Good (2013; 2015), Johnson et al. (2015) and Etienne et al. 
(2017) are a few of the studies that have analyzed the dynamic relation among these 
prices, each focusing on different time periods. Their results support the hypothesis 
that changes in corn and soybean meal prices affect DDG prices. Consequently, we 
include corn and soybean meal prices in our model. For example, Anderson et al. 
(2008) compared the time period from 1982 to 1988 with the time period from 1989 
to 2007. Their results suggest that the relationship between DDG and corn is the 
strongest price relationship among the three products investigated and that the 
relationship between corn and DDG prices varied among the different time periods 
due to the expansion of the DDG market. Tejeda (2012) examined weekly price 
changes of DDG, corn and soybean meal on the time periods pre and post the Energy 
Acts of 2005 and 2007. His study found a significantly positive dynamic correlation 
in the period between September 2004 and August 2011 of both corn and soybean 
meal prices with DDG prices.   
Irwin and Good (2013) analyzed the time period from 2007 to 2013 and found 
that 92% of the variation in DDG prices can be explained by the combination of corn 
and soybean meal prices. They reported that during this time frame, for every $1 per 
ton change in the prices of corn or the prices of soybean meal, DDG prices changed 
$0.85 per ton and $0.11 per ton, respectively. Irwin and Good (2015) did a follow-up 
study finding that DDG prices were impacted more by soybean meal prices between 
2011 and 2014, a period of high soybean meal prices. This latter study also reported 
seasonality differences in the prices of DDG. Further, a study by Johnson et al. (2015) 
12 
 
analyzed the price relation between DDG, corn, and soybean meal prices from 2007 
to 2014 and found that corn prices were the largest contributor to DDG price 
variations.  
Etienne et al. (2017) analyzed the relation between prices of corn, soybean 
meal and DDG from 2000 to 2016 by evaluating the volatility transmission and how 
those interrelations possibly changed over time. The authors found that DDG prices 
are positively linked to both corn and soybean meal prices, however, corn prices were 
found to impact DDG prices more than soybean meal prices; and that DDG prices 
have little impact on the other two markets. Even though the correlation between the 
DDG and corn prices strengthened between 2006 and 2012, it weakened after 2012, 
indicating the potential increasing importance of the DDG export market (Etienne et 
al. 2017). 
In addition to the correlation between prices, it is also important to take into 
account factors potentially impacting import demand. Farinelli et al. (2009) analyzed 
the import demand for Brazilian ethanol using a multiple regression model to estimate 
the long-run import demand for six importing countries. The quantity imported by 
each country was used as a function of import prices of ethanol, world import crude 
oil prices, real GDP, real exchange rate, import tariff, linear time trend and lagged 
quantity of ethanol imported. From Farinelli et al. (2009), we have a starting point 
about factors influencing DDG trade.  
  The U.S. DDG market is influenced by international trade. As discussed in 
section 2.1, trade with China represents a large portion of the U.S. DDG export 
market. The similarities between the fluctuations of DDG prices and the quantities 
exported to China monthly from January of 2009 to December of 2017 are shown in 
figure 6. Correlation during this time was calculated at 0.61 between DDG prices and 
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the quantity of DDG exported to China.6 The pattern shown in figure 6 suggests the 
potential influence of China’s policies on the U.S. DDG industry. Furthermore, Zhang 
(2017) studied U.S. and global impacts caused by Chinese sorghum imports. In 
Zhang’s study, different scenarios simulated possible effects on the U.S. and global 
markets that could be caused by the end of the Chinese corn price support policy and 
corn temporary reserve program nationwide. The results show that the eventual 
decrease of China’s sorghum imports leads to lower availability of sorghum and a 
decrease of sorghum prices in the global market.    
Limited research has analyzed the DDG trade market and, particularly, the 
trade between the United States and China. A study conducted by Matteis et al. 
(2017) used a gravity model to identify factors impacting U.S. DDG exports. Their 
results indicate that U.S. DDG exports were affected by U.S. ethanol production, ad 
valorem tariff, technical barriers to trade (indicator built from notifications of new 
regulations that U.S. trading partners sent to the WTO) and demand for DDG in 
importing countries (e.g. stock of cattle, red meat production or consumption). The 
authors conclude that the import demand for DDG was the most important factor to 
the U.S. DDG exports. Based on these results we assume that changes in the import 
demand will impact the U.S DDG exports. Consequently, the U.S. DDG exports work 
as an instrument through which changes in import demand may affect the U.S. DDG 
prices. Thus, we are incorporating components of the DDG import demand in our 
inverse demand model.  
Following Barten and Bettendorf (1989) and Dhoubhadel, Azzam and 
Stockton (2015), we develop an inverse demand model to analyze the impact of 
                                                 
6 U.S. DDG exported to China (Source: USDA ERS Database). Nominal U.S. DDG prices (Source: 
LMIC- USDA AMS: Eastern Cornbelt Distillers Grains Report (GX_GR212), Chicago, IL 
(WKDDGPrices)). Real U.S. DDG prices calculated using PPI grains base in December 2018.  
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domestic and export demand on DDG prices in the United States. According to 
Barten and Bettendorf (1989), inverse and regular demands are usually statistically 
different, which may cause inconsistent analysis. The decision of which one should be 
used depends on the characteristics of the market analyzed. Barten and Bettendorf 
(1989) suggest to always keep variables that are exogenously determined in the right-
hand side of the demand equation to prevent inaccuracy. Following Dhoubhadel, 
Azzam and Stockton (2015), we assume a fixed supply of DDG based upon the 
amount of ethanol produced in the United States. Therefore, DDG supply is inelastic. 
Inverse demand models constitute an alternative analysis to the standard 
consumer demand analysis (Anderson 1980). Inverse demand models can be 
developed as a system of equations (inverse demand systems) or as a single inverse 
demand equation. Inverse demand systems have three main characteristics. First, price 
is a function of quantity. Second, the system equations of prices are endogenously 
determined and derived from budget shares. And finally, variables in the system of 
equations are expressed as differential logarithms (Barten and Bettendorf 1989; 
Moschini and Vissa 1992; Wong and McLaren 2005; Lee and Kennedy 2008; Huang 
2015). Barten and Bettendorf (1989) point out that, even though inverse demand 
systems are very useful, they are not used more often given the difficulties in 
collecting the required data. The lack of available data prevents the current paper 
from using a full inverse demand system in our investigation of the DDG market. 
Furthermore, Huang (2015) argues that endogeneity is also frequently a challenge 
when estimating inverse demand systems, especially when quantities are linked with 
market prices. For the reasons mentioned above, we develop an inverse demand 
equation instead of a full inverse demand system in our analysis of the DDG market. 
15 
 
As an alternative to a full inverse demand system, Igami (2015) developed an 
inverse demand equation to analyze the impact of market power on international 
coffee bean prices. The author analyzed the impacts of market structure on coffee 
prices. The inverse demand equation consisted of the world price of coffee beans as a 
function of quantity demanded, a demand shifter (importing countries’ GDP), price of 
tea (coffee’s substitute) and an unobserved shock that represents variation in 
consumers’ preferences over time due to local temperature. The author added weather 
as an instrument for export quantity to address potential simultaneity bias and 
measurement error.  
Demand for a product can be modeled as separate markets within one 
equation. For example, (Meinken 1953) analyzed the demand for food by assuming a 
reduced-form equation derived from two simultaneously determined equations 
representing the demand for farm products in domestic and export outlets. Karp and 
Perloff (1993) investigated the level of competition and adjustment paths of the coffee 
export markets for Brazil and Colombia (the two largest coffee exporters in the 
world). The authors developed a basic inverse residual linear demand curve where the 
real price was a function of the total quantity exported from Brazil and Colombia 
combined, subtracted from a variable capturing the effects of exogenous variables 
such as exports of other countries, among others. We are interested in the effect of 
China’s trade policy and demand on U.S. DDG prices, thus we separate demand for 
U.S. DDG into export demand to China and residual demand (comprised of domestic 
consumption and exports to other countries).   
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Chapter 4: Model 
This section introduces the modeling procedure developed to investigate our 
objective. We develop an inverse demand equation that describes factors implicit in 
the domestic and export demands that may affect the U.S. DDG prices, focusing on 
the effect of changes in U.S. DDG prices due to Chinese policies.  
To analyze the impact of Chinese policies on U.S. DDG prices, we derive a 
model from the DDG market equilibrium between demand and supply. According to 
Dhoubhadel, Azzam and Stockton (2015), the supply of DDG is fixed based on the 
amount of ethanol production. Therefore, the U.S. DDG prices become a function of 
factors affecting demand. For this reason, we develop an inverse demand equation for 
DDG based on previous literature and the characteristics of the U.S. and international 
market. The total quantity of DDG produced in the United States 
(𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑) can be expressed as the sum of the quantity exported to China 
(𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎) plus the residual demand (𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙). The residual 
demand represents the quantity consumed domestically in the United States and the 
quantity exported (excluding China):  
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 = 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎   (1) 
Goldstein and Khan (1985) argue that a country’s ability to influence the 
world price of a specific good depends on three factors: the country’s share of world 
consumption expressed by import level, world production and the value of its own 
price elasticities of demand and supply for the good. Thus, we can argue that China’s 
demand may be affecting the U.S. DDG prices. Based on discussion from previous 
sections we have the following three conclusions: China, overall, has represented a 
large share of the world consumption of DDG and the United States is predominantly 
the largest producer of DDG in the world.  
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According to the U.S. Grains Council (2012), some of the main elements that 
can potentially impact the U.S. DDG prices are domestic demand, corn and soybean 
meal prices, availability of supply for export, and import tariffs. As discussed in the 
literature review, previous research has found a relation between corn, soybean meal 
and DDG prices. Therefore, the U.S. DDG production (𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑), is a 
function of U.S. DDG prices (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐺), corn prices (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛)and soybean 
meal prices (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙): 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐺, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙) (2) 
This step of the model focuses on China’s import demand for U.S. DDG. As 
mentioned in the literature section, Farinelli et al. (2009) investigate Brazil’s import 
demand of ethanol. Their study suggests that tariffs and import country’s GDP are 
two of the factors directly impacting the Brazilian import demand for ethanol. 
Following Farinelli et al. (2009), this piece of our model defines the Chinese import 
demand (𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎) as a function of China’s anti-dumping (𝐴𝐷) and 
countervailing (𝐶𝑉) duties, GMO requirement (𝐺𝑀𝑂), anti-dumping investigations 
(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) and Chinese real GDP (𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎):  
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 = 𝑔(𝐴𝐷, 𝐶𝑉, 𝐺𝑀𝑂, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎)  (3) 
To derive the inverse demand equation for DDG we first combine equations 
(1) and (3) resulting in equation (4). By substituting equation (2) into equation (4) we 
obtain equation (5). Finally, after rearranging equation (5) to solve for U.S. DDG 
prices we obtain the inverse demand for DDG in equation (6): 
𝑔(𝐴𝐷, 𝐶𝑉, 𝐺𝑀𝑂, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎) = 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 −
                                                                                          𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙   (4) 
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𝑔(𝐴𝐷, 𝐶𝑉, 𝐺𝑀𝑂, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎) =
                                                                        𝑓(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐺, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙) −
                                                                       𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙    (5) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐺 =                     
                            ℎ−(Quantity residual, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙, 𝐴𝐷, 𝐶𝑉, 𝐺𝑀𝑂,  
                            𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎)                                                            (6) 
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Chapter 5: Data 
Our study uses monthly data from January 1996 to December 2017, for a total of 264 
observations. Summary statistics of the data are presented in table 1. Weekly DDG 
nominal prices were collected from the Eastern Corn belt Distillers Grains Report and 
calculated by LMIC (2018). The DDG prices used represent the dried product. 
Monthly U.S. production of DDG is calculated based on the formula for fixed 
proportion of production of DDG and ethanol suggested by USDA AMS (2018) 
where one bushel of corn yields 2.8 gallons of ethanol and 17.75 pounds of DDG. 
Monthly ethanol production reported by the Energy Information Administration (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration 2018) is used to calculate the total DDG 
production. The residual demand for DDG was calculated as the difference between 
U.S. domestic production and exports to China. Monthly U.S. exports to China was 
reported by USDA ERS (2018). The USDA ERS database uses the term “Brewing or 
distilling dregs and waste” assigned to the code 23033000 of the Harmonized System 
classification, which for the United States is a suitable measure of DDG (RFA 2017). 
However, for other countries this code may also represent data for alternative 
products, which is a minimal amount relatively compared to the U.S data.   
Nominal prices of corn and soybean meal are collected from USDA AMS 
(2018). Corn prices are based on the reported prices for Chicago (IL) and soybean 
meal prices are based on the reported prices for 48% (Rail) Central Illinois. The 
collected nominal prices of DDG, soybean meal and corn are converted into real 
prices using Producer Price Index (PPI) for grains collected from the Federal Reserve 
Bank (2018a). The index base is adjusted to December 2017 = 100. 
Anti-dumping and countervailing duties are also included in the model. In 
September 2016, the anti-dumping duty was implemented at a 33.8% rate and the 
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countervailing duty at a range of 10 to 10.7%. In January 2017, the anti-dumping 
increased to a range of 42.2% to 53.7% rate and the countervailing duty increased to a 
range of 11.2 to 12%. The increased rate of both duties lasts until the most recent 
observation in December 2017. In our data, the observations of this variable consist of 
a dummy variable indicating zero for the period before the duties were imposed and 
one for the period when the duties are imposed. The information about the duties was 
collected from MOCPRC (2016) and MOCPRC (2017). 
A dummy variable was added to capture the GMO test requirement from July 
2013 to October 2014, where one indicates the policy was imposed and zero 
otherwise. Finally, China’s two anti-dumping investigations, from November 2010 to 
June 2012 and from January 2016 to August of 2016 are represented as one variable 
with one during the period of the investigations and zero otherwise.  
The current price GDP in China is collected from the Federal Reserve Bank 
(2018b) as quarterly data in billions of Chinese yuan, seasonally adjusted. The 
quarterly data is deflated using the annual GDP implicit price deflator collected from 
OECD (2018) and the index base is adjusted to January 2018 = 100. From the 
quarterly deflated data, monthly data was estimated through cubic spline 
interpolation. The monthly data is then converted in U.S. dollars using real monthly 
average exchange rates from the USDA ERS (2018). 
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Chapter 6: Empirical Specification  
The objective of this paper is to estimate the impact of domestic and export demand 
on U.S. DDG prices. Thus, we estimate the inverse demand specified in equation (6) 
and apply tests to check stationarity, multicollinearity, structural break, 
autocorrelation, homoskedasticity and normality. Based on these tests, we are running 
four models. We will first discuss the tests followed by the final models. First, we 
apply an augmented Dickey–Fuller test (ADF). ADF is used to test the null 
hypothesis that a unit root is present in the time series data. The presence of unit roots 
(i.e. series is not stationary) may cause problems in statistical inference. The ADF test 
indicates that U.S. DDG prices, residual demand, corn prices and soybean meal prices 
are non-stationary. After applying log transformation in all price variables and 
residual demand, all the variables became stationary (at the 10% significance level). 
In addition, the benefits of the log transformation extend to the possibility of 
analyzing the elasticity of our explanatory variables with respect to the U.S. DDG 
prices, so we are applying log transformation on the variables. Knowing that all our 
series are stationary, we do not need to test for cointegration. 
Continuing with the regression analysis, because AD and CV are dummy 
variables occurring at the same time, collinearity issues exist. Therefore, we decide to 
add one dummy variable to capture the joint impact caused by both duties. We also 
hypothesize that past values of corn and soybean meal prices could be affecting the 
U.S. DDG prices. However, after applying the variance inflation factor (VIF) test to 
check for correlation among explanatory variables (multicollinearity), we find high 
multicollinearity among current and past corn and soybean meal prices. The VIF test 
shows how much the variance of the estimated coefficients are inflated in comparison 
with a case where the explanatory variables are not linearly related. Usually, VIF 
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values exceeding 10 indicate multicollinearity (O’Brien 2007). Thus, we decide to run 
two different models. Model 1 has the impact of past corn and soybean meal prices, 
and model 2 does not contain them. The log of corn prices in model 2 has a VIF of 
13.97, which is much lower than its VIF in model 1 (54.32). Even with a VIF higher 
than 10, we decide to keep this variable in the models based on the theory discussed 
in previous sections of the importance of corn prices on DDG prices. By allowing a 
certain level of multicollinearity we are accepting standard errors potentially 
overestimated and, consequently, the significant test may be biased.   
The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation (i.e. the residuals are independent of 
one another) is tested using the Durbin-Watson (DW) test. We find evidence of 
autocorrelation in all four models (e.g. model 1 shows t-stat = 0.419 and p-value < 
0.001), therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. Autocorrelation is corrected in all 
models by including four lags of the dependent variable in the model; the number of 
lags is tested via hypothesis test. Also, the performance of the model suggested in 
equation 6 is tested though both AIC and BIC tests; both tests suggest that our models 
will be best performed if containing four lags. To check if the problem is fixed, the 
Durbin Watson test is performed again. No evidence of autocorrelation is found, 
failing to reject the null hypothesis (e.g. model 1 shows t-stat = 1.942 and p-value = 
0.166). 
A Chow test indicates a structural change beginning in September 2014. 
However, after adding the structural break, we test for multicollinearity again and find 
that it is highly correlated with the GDP variable (table 2 presents the correlation 
matrix of all variables). The VIF for GDP is indicated as 22.12. Without the structural 
break, the VIF for GDP is 9.19 (e.g. model 1). Given that both variables are important 
for our model, we decide to keep both in separate models. Thereby, we keep the GDP 
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variable in model 1 and 2 without the structural break. We add two new models 
(models 3 and 4) that do not include the GDP variable but the structural break. Model 
3 contains corn and soybean meal lags and model 4 does not. We re-apply the Chow 
test in models 3 and 4, finding that there is now a structural break in September 2010 
when GDP is not included. Thus, we add this structural change as a dummy variable 
indicating zero before September 2010 and one after. As we can hypothesize from the 
background section, the period after September 2010 is characterized by China 
becoming a major player in the DDG market. 
We also test the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity using the Breusch Pagan 
test. We find evidence of heteroskedasticity in all four models (e.g. model 1 shows t-
stat = 38.701, p-value < 0.001). To avoid biased inference, heteroskedasticity is fixed 
using Eicker–Huber–White standard errors.  
Finally, we test the normality of the residuals. We apply the Shapiro–Wilk 
normality test, because it has the highest power among all tests for normality. At 1% 
we fail to reject the hypothesis that the sample comes from a population which has a 
normal distribution (e.g. model 1: W = 0.99155, p-value = 0.141).  
As a result of the tests described above, after adding log transformations and 
significant time lags equation (6) becomes equation (7) for model 1, equation (8) for 
model 2, equation (9) for model 3 and equation (10) for model 4, which are the 
following estimated equations: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑡 +
                                  𝛼3𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑡−2 +
                                  𝛼5𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 +
                                  𝛼7(𝐴𝐷&𝐶𝑉)𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐺𝑀𝑂𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 +
                                  𝛼10𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 + 𝛼11𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−1 +
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                                  𝛼12𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−2 +   𝛼13𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−3 +
                                  𝛼14𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−4 + 𝜀1𝑡      (7) 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑡 +
                                  𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐴𝐷&𝐶𝑉)𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑀𝑂𝑡 +
                                  𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−1 +
                                  𝛽9𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−2 + 𝛽10𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−3 +
                                 𝛽11𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−4 + 𝜀2𝑡                 (8) 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑡 +
                                  𝛾3𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑡−2 +
                                  𝛾5𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 +
                                  𝛾7(𝐴𝐷&𝐶𝑉)𝑡 + 𝛾8𝐺𝑀𝑂𝑡 + 𝛾9𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 +
                                  𝛾10𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 + 𝛾11𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−1 +
                                  𝛾12𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−2 + 𝛾13𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−3 +
                                  𝛾14𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−4 + 𝜀3𝑡     (9) 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑡 +
                                  𝛿3𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛿4(𝐴𝐷&𝐶𝑉)𝑡 + 𝛿5𝐺𝑀𝑂𝑡 +
                                  𝛿6𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛿7𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 +
                                  𝛿8𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛿9𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−2 +
                                  𝛿10𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−3 + 𝛿11𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−4 + 𝜀4𝑡            (10) 
where (𝐴𝐷&𝐶𝑉) represents the dummy variable capturing the joint effect caused by 
the anti-dumping and countervailing rate imposed since September 2016. 
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Chapter 7: Results 
We want to identify the impact of China’s policies on U.S. DDG prices. Thus, 
equations (7) to (10) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression in 
R. Coefficients and robust standard errors for the four models are presented in table 3. 
The residual quantity has a significant negative impact on U.S. DDG prices.7 As 
previously discussed, because the U.S. DDG production is being considered inelastic, 
this variable captures the residual demand, predominantly U.S. DDG domestic 
consumption, as well as, the export demand to countries other than China. Over the 
entire period we are analyzing, the quantity of U.S. DDG domestically consumed has 
increased. From the exports perspective, exports to countries other than China has 
represented a larger share in recent years. For a 1% increase in residual demand U.S. 
DDG prices decrease by 0.045% to 0.077%, depending on the model.  
Our results suggest that current corn prices do not have a significant impact on 
current U.S. DDG prices in any of the four models. By adding corn price lags in 
models 1 and 3, the past values of corn prices capture some of the corn prices effect 
on current U.S. DDG prices. The first lag’s effects are negative, and the second lag’s 
effects are positive. For current soybean meal prices, all models show positive 
significant effects. A 1% increase in current soybean meal prices causes an increase in 
current U.S. DDG prices ranging from a 0.072% increase (model 4) to a 0.224% 
increase (model 1). Thus, low current soybean meal prices affect the DDG market by 
lowering the current U.S. DDG prices. The soybean meal price lag is shown to be 
negative in both model 1 and 3; indicating that the previous month price affects the 
current DDG’s monthly price negatively.  
                                                 
7 Results are considered significant at 10%. 
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Our objective is to determine the effect of China’s policies on U.S. DDG 
prices. All four models present a negative impact of anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties on U.S. DDG prices. We find that during the time the duties are being enforced 
there is a decrease in U.S. DDG prices ranging from 5.8% (model 1) to 7.4% (model 
4). This result indicates that government interventions in China are affecting the U.S. 
DDG market by decreasing U.S. DDG prices. Reductions in DDG prices can 
potentially affect the U.S. ethanol industry profitability. As described in the 
background section, these duties make U.S. DDG too expensive for Chinese buyers. 
Consequently, Chinese demand for U.S. DDG decreases. The Chinese demand 
represents an important share of the total demand for U.S. DDG, so we expect U.S. 
DDG prices to decrease as exports to China decrease. To compensate for the potential 
loss in revenue caused by low DDG exports to China, the United States has been 
looking for alternative export markets. Since 2015, new markets have emerged in the 
U.S. DDG export portfolio (e.g. Vietnam, South Korea) and in 2017 Mexico became 
the number one market for U.S. DDG. However, the exports to new markets have not 
been able to compensate the loss in U.S. DDG exports to China. The U.S. exports to 
China declined by 94.2% from the highest amount in 2015 to the lowest in 2017. 
Total exports of DDG declines from 2016 to 2017 by 3.5%. Due to shocks caused by 
the Chinese policies, the Chinese buyers may potentially be importing DDG from 
other countries by re-trade or also importing more substitutes of DDG.   
The variables indicating the time frame when China required GMO testing on 
DDG as well as the period in which the anti-dumping investigation was ongoing are 
found not significant. Current discussion in this paper leads us to hypothesize that 
these variables had a direct impact on the Chinese DDG import market, however, 
results indicate that there is no evidence supporting that U.S. DDG prices were 
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affected by them. While some shipments were rejected during the time period when 
the Chinese government was requiring GMO tests on U.S. DDG, a test requirement 
does not necessarily cause a permanent drop in the level of U.S. DDG consumption. 
The shipments were sporadically rejected over the time analyzed. Thus, these 
rejections may not be strong enough to significantly impact the U.S. DDG prices, as 
our results suggest. Our results also suggest that the anti-dumping investigations do 
not directly affect U.S. DDG prices. However, the investigations could affect the 
DDG market by generating uncertainty regarding the future trade conditions. Our 
results indicate that the potential uncertainty created by the investigations was not 
strong enough to significantly affect the U.S. DDG prices.     
The GDP variable is shown to affect U.S. DDG prices positively. Results 
suggest that a one unit increase (millions of dollars) in China’s GDP, increases the 
U.S. DDG prices by 5.7% and 6.4% in models 1 and 2, respectively. The income 
elasticity at the mean value indicates that a 1% increase in China’s GDP increases 
U.S. DDG prices by 0.084% and 0.095%. As China’s GDP increases, Chinese buyers 
can purchase more, therefore Chinese demand for DDG may increases. A relatively 
higher demand for DDG implies higher U.S. DDG prices.  
The log linear regression model is estimated under the assumption that 
parameters are constant over time. However, a deep understanding of market 
operations may signal the existence of shifts in the pattern of the data in the time 
period analyzed. These potential shifts reflect lack of stability of the coefficients, 
which may lead to poor estimated coefficients. For this reason, the existence of 
structural changes is important to be checked. In our model, structural changes were 
suspected to exist because of the dynamic nature of economic systems. The period 
after September 2010 characterizes the moment when China became a major player in 
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the DDG market. The result of the regression analysis reveals that U.S. DDG prices 
increased 9.6% and 8.9% in models 3 and 4, respectively, since China boosted its 
U.S. DDG imports (starting in September 2010). This result shows how important the 
Chinese consumption is for the U.S. DDG market, as previously discussed in the 
literature review.  
Our model is also a dynamic model, since we are adding lagged variables to 
incorporate the effect of past values of U.S. DDG prices on the current one. The 
results suggest that the four lags are significantly affecting the current U.S. DDG 
price. Thus, we have evidence that the state of the time series up to four months back 
still has influence on current U.S. DDG prices. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Since 2010, China has become an important trade partner for the United States 
regarding the DDG market. In 2015, China imported their largest amount of U.S. 
DDG representing 51% of total U.S. DDG exports. It is expected that variations on 
that Chinese market due to changing Chinese policies will consequently affect the 
U.S. DDG market. China's anti-dumping and countervailing duties impact imports of 
U.S. DDG. We find that the decrease in U.S. DDG prices ranges from 5.8% to 7.4% 
compared to when the duties were not in place.  
 The future of these exports depends on China’s trade policies and on the 
availability and prices of alternative products. Understanding the effect of China’s 
policies and keeping track of future negotiations are important to predict and adapt to 
changes in the market of DDG and related products.   
 The residual demand significantly affects U.S. DDG prices (calculated by 
subtracting U.S. DDG exports to China from U.S. DDG production). The residual 
demand captures U.S. domestic demand and rest of world (demand other than China). 
Even though the exports to the rest of the world have increased, the increase is not 
enough to compensate for the decrease in exports to China. The gap between U.S. 
production and total exports has increased. Thus, we can conclude that the domestic 
consumption of DDG has grown, and it may be driving the impact of residual demand 
on U.S. DDG prices.  
A future perspective for the DDG market indicates challenges and 
opportunities. After the most recent challenges in trading with China, the United 
States has been trying to compensate the total exports of their DDG by increasing 
exports to other countries. Additionally, with Chinese corn stocks potentially 
decreasing and the approval of Syngenta GM corn, we could potentially expect a 
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recovery of the DDG trade with China in 2018. However, the progress of the U.S. 
DDG exports to China will continue to depend on the U.S. and Chinese governmental 
policies. On one hand, China has announced an additional 30% tariff on U.S. DDG as 
a retaliation against the United States 25% tariff on Chinese imports. On the other 
hand, China is considering removing the value-added tax on imports of U.S. DDG. 
Both changes are expected to happen in 2018, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty 
for the short and long run. 
During the years that China has not been the number one export market of 
U.S. DDG, Mexico has taken the lead. However, Mexico has only increased slightly 
its imports of U.S. DDG. One of the factors contributing to the increase in exports to 
Mexico is the competitive DDG prices over soybean meal prices. Moreover, in July of 
2017, the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiation objectives 
were released. One of the objectives is to reassure the U.S. ethanol and DDG exports 
to Canada and Mexico. Hence, this objective suggests a desire in keeping reciprocal 
duty-free market Accessed for agricultural goods among the three countries. 
However, the uncertainty about the future of NAFTA remains. Since 2015, Vietnam 
has also become a potentially important market for the U.S. DDG. In 2015, the 
country imported 717.64 thousand tons of U.S. DDG. Vietnam decided to temporarily 
withhold U.S. DDG imports in December of 2016 after discovering U.S. DDG 
shipments contaminated with warehouse beetle. In September of 2017, the 
Vietnamese government announced that it would discontinue the suspension of DDG 
imports and better accommodate fumigation requirements for U.S. corn and wheat 
imports. Following this announcement, U.S. DDG shipments arrived in Vietnam in 
the end of 2017. Hence, for 2018, we can expect an increase in the Vietnam 
participation of U.S. DDG total exports.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: U.S. Production and Total Exports of Distiller’s Grains 
Note: Production was calculated from USDA AMS: 2.8 bushels of corn=1gallon of 
ethanol and 17.75 pounds of DDG.  
U.S. Total Exports: ERS Feed Grains (2017) Database. 
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Figure 2: Total “Brewing or distilling dregs and waste” Exports from the United 
States and Rest of the World (ROW) 
Note: Rest of the world (ROW) represents the total “brewing or distilling dregs and 
waste” exports less the exports from the United States. The 2017 data were not 
available in the U.N. Comtrade by the time this graph was made. 
Source: USDA ERS, 2018.
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Figure 3: Total “Brewing or distilling dregs and waste” Exports from the United 
States to China, Mexico and Rest of the World (ROW) 
Source: USDA ERS Database, 2017. 
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Figure 4: Yearly Trade Patterns for “Brewing or distilling dregs and waste” in 
China and the United States, 2000-2017 
Source: U.N. Comtrade, 2018.  China Total Imports of “brewing or distilling dregs 
and waste” data for 2017 were not available by the time this figure was made.
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Figure 5: Monthly U.S. “Brewing or distilling dregs and waste” Exports to China January 2009-December 2017 
Source: USDA ERS, 2017
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Figure 6: U.S. Exports to China and U.S. Distiller’s Grains Real Prices from 
January 2009 to December 2017 
Source: U.S. Exports to China: USDA ERS, 2018  
U.S. DDG prices: USDA AMS, 2018 (Eastern Cornbelt Distillers Grains Report 
(GX_GR212), Chicago, IL). 
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Tables 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Monthly Data from January 1996 to Dec 2017,    
n = 264 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description Mean Std.dev Min Max 
Price DDG  $/ton 124.64 21.44 86.88 182.66 
Quantity 
residual 
Million tons 1743.03 1254.05 133.09 3940.60 
Price Corn $/ton 126.39 44.58 52.27 220.72 
Price 
Soybean 
Meal 
$/ton 293.95 121.70 74.07 608.90 
AD&CV 1 for AD and 
CV duties 
starting in 
Sep. 2016; 0 
otherwise 
0.06 0.24 0 1 
GMO 1 for GMO 
test 
requirement 
from July 
2013 to Oct. 
2014; 0 
otherwise 
0.06 0.24 0 1 
Investigation 1 for 
investigations 
from Nov. 
2010 to June 
2012 and 
from Jan. 
2016 to Aug. 
2016; 0 
otherwise 
0.11 0.31 0 1 
GDP China Millions of 
dollars 
1.48 0.98 0.36 3.78 
Structural 
Change  
1 starting in 
Sep. 2010; 0 
otherwise 
0.34 0.47 0 1 
  
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 log Quantity residual - 
              
2 log Corn Price -0.71 - 
             
3 log Corn Pricet-1 -0.70 0.97 - 
            
4 log Corn Pricet-2 -0.70 0.96 0.97 - 
           
5 log Soybean Meal -0.53 0.90 0.88 0.85 - 
          
6 log Soybean  
Mealt-1 
-0.52 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.97 - 
         
7 AD&CV 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.09 - 
        
8 GMO 0.24 -0.26 -0.28 -0.30 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 - 
       
9 Investigation 0.36 -0.40 -0.40 -0.39 -0.47 -0.48 -0.09 -0.09 - 
      
10 GDP China 0.88 -0.63 -0.63 -0.64 -0.41 -0.41 0.46 0.34 0.32 - 
     
11 Structural Change 0.47 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 0.07 0.08 0.60 -0.02 0.13 0.71 - 
    
12 log Price DDGt-1 -0.48 0.41 0.41 0.37 0.47 0.47 -0.14 0.17 -0.23 -0.23 -0.04 - 
   
13 log Price DDGt-2 -0.49 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.48 0.47 -0.12 0.18 -0.26 -0.25 -0.04 0.89 - 
  
14 log Price DDGt-3 -0.49 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.48 0.47 -0.10 0.20 -0.29 -0.26 -0.03 0.75 0.89 - 
 
15 log Price DDGt-4 -0.49 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.49 0.48 -0.09 0.20 -0.30 -0.27 -0.02 0.64 0.75 0.89 - 
16 Structural Change 1 0.73 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64 -0.48 -0.48 0.36 0.36 0.49 0.90 0.60 -0.11 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 
Note: Structural Change 1 refers to the structural change starting in September 2014 tested by Chow test and not added in the final model.
4
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Table 3: Effects on log Price DDG 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 2.130*** 2.450*** 1.932*** 2.197*** 
 (0.410) (0.400) (0.346) (0.356) 
log Quantity -0.067 *** -0.077*** -0.045*** -0.051*** 
residual (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011) 
log Price Corn -0.078 -0.053 0.071 -0.075 
 (0.090) (0.047) (0.089) (0.047) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 -0.425***  -0.430***  
 (0.108)  (0.106)  
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑡−2 0.294***  0.286***  
 (0.058)  (0.057)  
log Price Soybean  0.199*** 0.072*** 0.224*** 0.101*** 
Meal (0.073) (0.033) (0.073) (0.034) 
log Price Soybean -0.132**  -0.132**  
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 (0.077)  (0.079)  
AD&CV -0.066***  -0.074*** -0.058*** -0.063*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) 
GMO -0.019 -0.007 -0.031 -0.019 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) 
Investigation 0.007 0.017 -0.020 -0.012 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) 
GDP China 0.057*** 0.064***   
 (0.015) (0.015)   
Structural Change    0.089*** 0.096*** 
   (0.021) (0.022) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−1 1.163 *** 0.989*** 1.166*** 0.998*** 
 (0.066) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−2 -0.541*** -0.362*** -0.544*** -0.371*** 
 (0.088) (0.094) (0.087) (0.096) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−3 0.261** 0.210*** 0.256*** 0.205*** 
 (0.075) (0.093) (0.077) (0.096) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐺𝑡−4 -0.173*** 0.172*** -0.188*** -0.188*** 
 (0.052) (0.062) (0.055) (0.065) 
Note: (***), (**), (*) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Robust Standard Errors in (). 
Model 1: Residual standard error: 0.0613. Multiple R-squared: 0.878, Adjusted R-
squared: 0.871 F-statistic: 126 on 14 and 245 DF, p-value: < 0.000. 
Model 2: Residual standard error: 0.0706. Multiple R-squared: 0.8363, Adjusted R-
squared: 0.829 F-statistic: 115.2 on 11 and 248 DF, p-value: < 0.000. 
Model 3: Residual standard error: 0.0612. Multiple R-squared: 0.8783, Adjusted R-
squared: 0.8713 F-statistic: 126.3 on 14 and 245 DF, p-value: < 0.000. 
Model 4: Residual standard error: 0.0707. Multiple R-squared: 0.8355, Adjusted R-
squared: 0.8282 F-statistic: 114.5 on 11 and 248 DF, p-value: < 0.000.
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Appendix: R Code 
```{r ADF test } 
#DDG prices 
adf.test(ddgs_dt_s1$lrprice_d_US) 
#Residual demand   
adf.test(ddgs_dt_s1$res_d_US) 
#Corn price   
adf.test(ddgs_dt_s1$rprice_c_US) 
#Soybean meal price  
adf.test(ddgs_dt_s1$rprice_sm_US) 
#Investigations 
adf.test(ddgs_dt_s1$inv1_inv2) 
#DUMP   
adf.test(ddgs_dt_s1$dump01) 
#GMO 
adf.test(ddgs_dt_s1$gmo) 
#Structural change   
adf.test(ddgs_dt_s1$st_1) 
#rGDP_ch 
adf.test(ddgs_dt_s1$GDP_ch) 
``` 
 
``` {r initial eq} 
#Initial equation 
reg<- lm(lrprice_d_US~ lres_d_US+ lrprice_c_US+ lrprice_sm_US+ inv1_inv2+ 
dump01+ gmo+ GDP_ch, data=ddgs_dt_s1) 
#Multicollinearity 
vif(reg) 
 
#CorrelationMatrix 
data1 <- ddgs_dt_s1[, c("lres_d_US","lrprice_c_US", "lrprice_c_1", 
"lrprice_c_2","lrprice_sm_US","lrprice_sm_1","dump01","gmo","inv1_inv2","GDP_
ch", "st_2","lrprice1","lrprice2", "lrprice3", "lrprice4", "st_1" )] 
cor <- cor(data1) 
``` 
 
#Model 1 
```{r Model1 gdp} 
reg1 <- 
lm(lrprice_d_US~lrprice1+lrprice2+lrprice3+lrprice4+lres_d_US+lrprice_c_US+lrpri
ce_c_1+lrprice_c_2+lrprice_sm_US+lrprice_sm_1+inv1_inv2+dump01+gmo+GDP_
ch,data=ddgs_dt_s1) 
``` 
###Normality 
res1 is the residual Im extracting to use later in the Wu Hausman test 
```{r Normality1} 
res1=residuals(reg1,type="response") 
shapiro.test(res1) 
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``` 
###Multicollinearity 
```{r Model1 VIF} 
vif(reg1) 
``` 
###Homocedasticity 
```{r Model1 Heterosk} 
bptest(reg1) #Heter 
``` 
###Autocorrelation 
```{r Model1 Autocorrelation} 
dwtest(reg1) # No Auto 
``` 
###Final Model- Robust SE 
```{r Model1 gdp RobustSE} 
reg1_1 <- coeftest(reg1, vcov = vcovHC(reg1, type="HC1")) 
``` 
#Model 2 
```{r Model2 gdp} 
reg2 <- 
lm(lrprice_d_US~lrprice1+lrprice2+lrprice3+lrprice4+lres_d_US+lrprice_c_US+lrpri
ce_sm_US+inv1_inv2+dump01+gmo+GDP_ch,data=ddgs_dt_s1) 
``` 
###Normality 
res2 is the residual Im extracting to use in the Wu Hausman test 
```{r Normality2} 
res2=residuals(reg2,type="response") 
shapiro.test(res2) 
``` 
#Multicollinearity 
```{r Model2 VIF} 
vif(reg2) 
``` 
###Hemoscedasticity 
 
```{r Model2 Heterosk} 
bptest(reg2) #Heter 
``` 
###Autocorrelation 
```{r Model2 Autocorrelation} 
dwtest(reg2) # No Auto 
``` 
###Final Model- Robust SE 
```{r Model2 gdp RobustSE} 
reg2_1 <- coeftest(reg2, vcov = vcovHC(reg2, type="HC1")) 
``` 
#Model 3 
```{r Model3} 
reg3 <- 
lm(lrprice_d_US~lrprice1+lrprice2+lrprice3+lrprice4+lres_d_US+lrprice_c_US+lrpri
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ce_c_1+lrprice_c_2+lrprice_sm_US+lrprice_sm_1+inv1_inv2+dump01+gmo+st_1,d
ata=ddgs_dt_s1) 
``` 
###Normality 
res3 is the residual Im extracting to use in the Wu Hausman test 
```{r Normality3} 
res3=residuals(reg3,type="response") 
shapiro.test(res3) 
``` 
###Multicollinearity 
```{r Model3 VIF} 
vif(reg3)  
``` 
###Homoscedasticity 
```{r Model3 Heterosk} 
bptest(reg3) #Heter 
``` 
###Autocorrelation 
```{r Model3 Autocorrelation} 
dwtest(reg3) # No Auto 
``` 
###Final Model- Robust SE 
```{r Model3 RobustSE} 
reg3_1 <- coeftest(reg3, vcov = vcovHC(reg3, type="HC1")) 
``` 
#Model 4 
```{r Model4} 
reg4 <- 
lm(lrprice_d_US~lrprice1+lrprice2+lrprice3+lrprice4+lres_d_US+lrprice_c_US+lrpri
ce_sm_US+inv1_inv2+dump01+gmo+st_1,data=ddgs_dt_s1) 
``` 
###Normality 
res4 is the residual Im extracting to use in the Wu Hausman test 
```{r Normality} 
res4=residuals(reg4,type="response") 
shapiro.test(res4) 
``` 
###Multicollinearity 
 
```{r Model4 VIF} 
vif(reg4) 
``` 
###Homoscedasticity 
```{r Model4 Heterosk} 
bptest(reg4) #Heter 
``` 
###Autocorrelation 
```{r Model4 Autocorrelation} 
dwtest(reg4) # No Auto 
``` 
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###Final Model- Robust SE 
```{r Model4 RobustSE} 
reg4_1 <- coeftest(reg4, vcov = vcovHC(reg4, type="HC1")) 
``` 
